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ABSTRACT
Manufacturing companies that successfully grow their markets and operations face the
challenge coordinating operations to capture the value created by economies of scale. However,
sharing best practices across organizations requires diligent coordination between the multiple
business units. This research describes and examines a method for coordination and knowledge
transfer commonly referred to as Copy Exact. This method, often associated with technology
transfer in semiconductor fabrication facilities, can be readily applied to implementation of large-
scale information systems.
By sharing the collective knowledge and resources of multiple independent groups
within a larger organization, the Copy Exact approach can lower total development and
implementation costs, accelerate the time required for full solution deployment, and improve
likelihood of smooth, trouble-free implementations. However, the close coordination required to
execute the Copy Exact approach gives rise to significant coordination costs, and requires careful
attention to methods of communication and knowledge sharing applied.
Dell Computer Corporation has applied the Copy Exact methodology to implement
factory level supply chain integration package across its 12 worldwide manufacturing facilities.
The decision to apply Copy Exact during implementation of the DSi2 system at Dell yielded
significant benefits for the cost, speed, stability, and sustainability of the project. However, Copy
Exact also created challenges of factory specific software customization and of trans-global
project support. The nature and significance of these benefits and challenges are detailed and,
where possible, quantified in this thesis. Further, tactics useful for maximizing the Copy Exact
benefits and managing the challenges are presented.
The findings of this research indicate that Copy Exact can be successfully applied to
information systems implementations. Dell stands to benefit from further application of Copy
Exact to multi-factory projects, and similar manufacturing organizations can learn from Dell's
example.
Thesis Supervisors:
Charles Fine, Chrysler Leaders For Manufacturing Professor
David K. Gifford, Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Leading companies in the high technology industry are in many ways suffering
the ill effects of their own phenomenal growth and success. One of the challenges
common to successful high growth technology manufacturing organizations is how to
maintain the operational consistency between their many factories that allow the
companies to take full advantage of their dominant scale positions. One approach to
creating coordination between manufacturing sites is known as Copy Exact (alternately,
Copy Exactly) - an approach popularized by industry giant Intel Corporation during the
1990's. The Copy Exact approach to development of facilities, systems, and processes
requires that multiple sites within the company freely share and co-develop solutions to
achieve common goals.
By sharing the collective knowledge and resources of multiple independent
groups within a larger organization, the Copy Exact approach can lower total
development and implementation costs, accelerate the time required for full solution
deployment, and improve likelihood of smooth, trouble-free implementations.
However, the close coordination required to execute the Copy Exact approach gives rise
to significant coordination costs, and requires careful attention to methods of
communication and knowledge sharing applied.
The objective of this thesis is to examine in detail the benefits and costs of
applying the Copy Exact approach to large-scale projects that span several divisions of a
large organization. This thesis specifically examines the methods and results of a large-
scale information systems project within industry leader Dell Computer Corporation of
Round Rock, Texas. Dell, which has historically approached similar projects in a
decentralized, site-specific manner, has committed to applying the Copy Exact method
on this project and stands to gain significant operational advantage if the approach can
be successfully replicated.
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THESIS OVERVIEW
This thesis will begin with a brief overview of Dell Computer Corporation,
including the origin and the history of the Company. Next, the core business strategy of
the Company, including the Direct Sales Model and the Build to Order Manufacturing
Model will be summarized. Building on this will be an overview of the Company's
basic organizational structure as it pertains to the scope of this thesis. In Chapter 3, a
more detailed description of the Company's manufacturing environment will be given
and an overview of the information systems project, code-named DSi2, will be
presented. Next, a working definition and broader discussion of the Copy Exact
approach are provided. Chapter 4 begins to explore the tactics used by the DSi2 project
team to execute the Copy Exact strategy. Based on observations, interviews, and team
survey results, hypotheses of which tactics proved more and less effective tactics are
offered. Chapter 5 presents quantifiable findings of the real benefits Dell realized
through application of Copy Exact, including demonstrations of learning curve effects
resulting from repeated implementations of a single common solution. Chapter 6
presents and discusses a systems dynamics model proposed by the author for larger
organizational effects that result from Copy Exact projects like the DSi2 implementation.
Chapter 7 presents several final recommendations for the future application of Copy
Exact in large manufacturing companies. Finally, the author suggests areas of potential
future study.
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1.2
2 BACKGROUND OF DELL'S DECENTRALIZED
ORGANIZATION
2.1 COMPANY BACKGROUND
Dell Computer Corporation, the world's largest direct computer systems
company, represents one of the most dynamic and well known growth stories of the
1990's. The computer manufacturer began operations in 1984 when an 18 year old
undergraduate college student named Michael Dell began customizing IBM clones with
extra memory, disk drives, and modems, selling the systems at a deep discount. The
model was simple. By listening to the specific needs of each individual customer - and
building customized systems to match those needs - Dell could sell exactly what the
customer demanded and could keep unsold finished goods to zero.
Since the Company's modest beginnings, Dell has grown to a Fortune 50
company with annual sales of $32 billion. The company targets an entire range of
customer segments from personal users to government/large business enterprise users,
who make up 60% of yearly sales for the company. The Round Rock, Texas based
company is truly global, and services customers in markets worldwide with
manufacturing facilities in Austin, Texas; Nashville, Tenn.; Eldorado do Sul, Brazil;
Limerick, Ireland; Penang, Malaysia; and Xiamen, China.
2.1.1 Dell Direct Model
The Company has maintained the core of Michael Dell's fundamental business
model with its well-known Dell Direct Model. The company sells its products only
through direct-to-the-customer channels such as telephone and the web, Dell ensures
that no intermediaries wedge themselves between the manufacturer and its customer
base. Dell continues to organize the corporate structure and employee culture around a
strong dedication to the customer and their needs. Sales and Marketing groups within
the company are segmented by customer type (e.g. Government, Universities) rather
than by product type (e.g. servers, laptops). Other functions within the company by and
11
large are aligned around these customer segmented sales and marketing groups. The
structure allows the company to focus on the needs of its customers rather than the
features of its products. This organizational structure will be discussed in greater detail
in Section 2.3.
2.1.2 Build-to-Order Model
Hand-in-hand with the direct sales model is Dell's "build-to-order"
manufacturing model. Just as Michael Dell did during the company's first months, Dell
builds systems only after customers have selected - and paid for - the computer. The
primary advantages of this model are twofold. First, because the company gets paid
from its customers before it pays for (and in many cases, procures) the components, it
maintains a negative cash cycle. This is especially important in the computer industry
because of the tremendous holding cost of inventory that devalues by the day. Second,
the Company can ensure ultimate configurability and choice to the customer, since no
pre-built systems need to be "pushed" through sales channels at the customers.
The build-to-order model, and its companion the direct sales model, is central to
the company's overall strategy. Thus, manufacturing operations at Dell are structured
to optimize velocity (1 / lead time + cycle time) rather than output. To keep pace with
the nearly infinite number of possible configurations, Dell factories are designed for
ultra-small production batches and high product customization.
2.2 COMPANY GROWTH & FACTORY START-UPS
Dell has grown production and sales rates incredibly quickly during the latter
half of the 1990's - between 1995 and 2000, dollar sales increased approximately seven-
fold, as is shown in Figure 2-1. It should not come as a surprise, then, that the
manufacturing operations within the company have had to scale at a similarly rapid
rate. Coupled with Dell's globalization efforts and commitment to create capacity
within major worldwide sales regions, the growth has required an accelerating number
of factory start-ups in both North America and worldwide regions. Figure 2-2 shows
approximate beginning of production dates for Dell manufacturing facilities across the
globe. New factories are being added at an increasing rate (though no forward looking
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trends are implied by the author). Further complicating the Company's portfolio of
manufacturing facilities, Dell is continuously improving its manufacturing process in
search of factories that can deliver higher flexibility and velocity at lower costs. Thus,
there is at times only a mild resemblance between factories erected only a few years
apart.
Figure 2-1 Dell Computer Corp. Annual Revenues
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Figure 2-2 Timeline of New Factory Start-Ups
2.3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
A partial organizational chart, Figure 2-3, has been included to illustrate the basic
organizational alignment of Dell Computer Corporation. While many details (and
groups) have been omitted in the interest of readability, the chart shows that Dell's
North American factories are aligned to product groups, which belong to sales segments
(i.e. Home & Small Business), which in turn report to top executive management. This
organization makes sense at Dell for two reasons: (1) it underscores Dell's core focus on
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customers by placing customer segments in the top level, (2) it keeps ground-level
business units (e.g. Dimension Manufacturing) as nimble and responsive as possible.
Though sales segments can (and constantly do) sell products that are manufactured in
all product families (i.e. Home & Small Business can sell Optiplex), many of the product-
segment alignments make sense (e.g. Dimension and HSB).
The organizational structure also creates some challenges that are relevant to the
scope of this thesis. With the exception of Optiplex factories PN2 and MT12, or Regional
factories such as APCC and APCC2, organizational contact points between sites occur in
the VP or CEO/CFO/COO ranks. This increases the difficulty in achieving coordination
between factories relative to an organization where all manufacturing and operations
were joined under a functional group.
Simplified Organizational Chart (3/17/00)
Office of the Chair
CEO/CFO/COO I
Corporate Staff
Finance, HR, Legal, U/T, Admin, etc...
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Figure 2-3. Simplified Organizational Chart (as of 3/17/00)
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3 DSi2 DEMAND FULFILLMENT SOFTWARE: A COPY EXACT
APPROACH
3.1 COPY EXACT HISTORY
At the heart of my project and thesis is the philosophy of copy exact, or CE
(referred to elsewhere in the industry as "copy exactly"). CE is a mindset that argues for
forced commonality across groups in an organization so that the network benefits and
economies of scale that exist in large organizations can be maximized. CE can apply to
any or all aspects of a company's operations, ranging from chemical processes to
information systems to organizational structures. However, Copy Exact is typically
applied selectively within a company, standardizing certain aspects of operations while
leaving others untouched.
The copy exact philosophy is most closely associated with Intel Corporation,
although the concepts of copy exact exist under different names in countless
organizations. Intel first coined the term and applied the copy exact principles in 1990 in
an effort to minimize the time required for a technology to be transferred and to ensure
high initial product quality and yield. For Intel, the manufacturing challenge that gave
rise to CE was the inherent difficulty they faced in bringing new fabrication facilities up
to productive levels as quickly as the market demand grew. The result of copy exact has
been extremely positive. Simultaneously, yields have been improved while reducing the
time required for new fabs to move from tool qualification to profitability from 24
months to only 13. Intel has placed great importance on copy exact and emphasizes the
importance of the approach to new employees and suppliers.
3.2 COPY EXACT AT DELL
The critical manufacturing challenges faced by Dell differ greatly from those of
Intel, and thus copy exact at Dell will take a very different shape. While quick ramp-up
and high product yield are most core to Intel's success, manufacturing agility and
supply chain efficiency are most critical to Dell. Thus, the discussion of copy exact as it
15
relates to Dell will concentrate on its applications on supply chain systems and
processes.
3.2.1 Internal Manufacturing Flow
To understand the backdrop on which copy exact was implemented at Dell, it's
first necessary to describe the flow of operations in a typical factory, and then to explain
methods by which the DSi2 project sought to alter that flow.
A computer system order moves through up to 10 distinct stages during the
build process at Dell's factory. Note that since every computer built at Dell has already
been selected and purchased by a customer, the only distinction between the terms
"order" and "system" is that an "order" can often contain multiple identically
configured systems (e.g. for a business customer buying 5, 10, or 50 desktops at once).
Below is a brief summary of the 10 stages:
1) A TB - The first stage a computer build order moves to is Available to Build,
or ATB. As the name suggests, an order that is classified as ATB can be built
by a designated factory as soon as materials and human resources are
available to do so.
2) OMAC - Many (but not all) factories next run a database query for Order
Material Availability Checking, or OMAC. The query checks the electronic
inventory records for the factory and determines if a given factory (or given
production line) has all the necessary components (e.g. disk drives,
motherboards, wire harnesses, etc.) for assembly of the entire order. If the
factory or line does have all the needed parts, the order moves to stage (4)
Traveler Pull. If it does not, the order moves to stage (3) OMA C Fail.
3) OMA C Fail - Once an order is logged to OMAC Fail, a periodic report is
generated and sent to the factory's materials planner for corrective action.
Planners then place replenishment orders to the supplier warehouses
(described below) for the shortage parts. Orders wait in this status until the
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parts arrive. OMAC is again run and if another part is missing, the system is
again logged into OMAC Fail.
4) Traveler Pull - If all parts needed are available, a factory technician prints a
hard copy of a traveler for each system included in the order (to a max of 50).
Stacks of these travelers, which contain all details necessary for proper
system assembly, are then handed to the kitting line's personnel.
5) Kitting - At the kitting operation, all of the components that belong inside the
chassis assembly (along with the chassis itself) are placed into large plastic
totes and sent via conveyor to the next area, System Build.
6) System Build - Assembly technicians take all components included in the
"kit" and build the system. The build step itself is relatively fast, taking only
two to three minutes.
7) Quick Check & Burn In - The completed system is then placed in a "bum rack"
where the appropriate operating system, drivers, and factory pre-installed
software are added. Additionally, basic checks for functionality of ports,
video cards, and modems are run. If the system does not function correctly,
it is placed into a troubleshooting loop that is beyond the scope of the process
described here.
8) Boxing - Configured and functional systems are then sent to the boxing line,
where they are placed into their cardboard shipping container. At this time,
keyboards, mice, user manuals, and CD-ROM copies of pre-loaded software
are added. Boxes are sealed and transferred to the shipping station.
9) SPAM Merge - Orders with multiple systems staged until every system in the
order has completed boxing. They then are palletized together and matched
with the associated peripherals, including speakers, printers, and monitors
(a.k.a. SPAMs).
10) Shipping - Complete orders are finally loaded on outbound freight carriers,
where they may be shipped directly to the customer or may be sent to a
logistics company (e.g. UPS) for final shipment.
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Inbound Materials Flow
As the above description of internal factory logistics illustrates, Dell factories are
highly dependent on the ability of component suppliers to deliver specific parts and
quantities in a very timely manner. To accomplish this without requiring suppliers to
make very inefficient daily shipments to each factory, Dell utilizes "Supplier Logistics
Centers" or SLCs to stock up to two weeks worth of safety stock. Understanding of the
SLC operations are as important to Dell's Information Systems requirements as are the
internal factory operations.
Pull to Order Materials
ConceptProduction
Schedule
SLCs & SLCSuppliers Commits Bui d
\\ 
Schedule
Timed
Deliveries
Kitting Docks
Line-Specific
shipments
Figure 3-1. Diagram of Pull to Order Factory Flow
Suppliers (e.g. hard disk manufacturers) are contractually required to maintain a
target stock of materials in these independently managed SLCs typically equal to about
one to two weeks of inventory. The inventory, however, does not officially belong to
Dell until it is moved into the Dell factory, where inventory targets are much lower
(typically measured in hours, not weeks). Deliveries from the SLCs to the factories are
scheduled several times per day, and contain components from multiple suppliers.
Success within the factory requires effective means of scheduling these shipments.
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3.2.2
PULL TO ORDER METHODOLOGY
Dell has gained a reputation for excellence in the practice of "build to order",
meaning that no computers are built to stock in anticipation of future orders. An
extension of this manufacturing practice that will be explored in this thesis is the
practice of "pull to order". The current practice in the majority of Dell's operations is a
classical "Min-Max" material replenishment procedure while others are pioneering the
pull-to-order replenishment method. This disconnect is a major hurdle to copy exact
application of production scheduling applications so it is important to outline the two
methods and their key differences.
3.3.1 Min-Max
In this method of replenishment, various components required for system
assembly (e.g. hard drives) are assigned an efficient economic order quantity based on
product-specific parameters including order cost, holding cost (i.e. space required and
purchase cost), and standard shipment quantities. Based on this quantity and an
assumed replenishment lead-time, a theoretical reorder point is calculated. Each time
inventory falls below this reorder point, materials planners place an order for
replenishment from the SLC. The key advantage of this method is simplicity and ability
to visually spot problems in the component inventory stocks (#'s of boxes in storage).
The major shortcoming of this method is the high level of manual material inspection it
requires. Historically, one or more full-time stock checkers have been required to
constantly monitor inventory levels to trigger reorder points.
3.3.2 Pull to Order
By contrast, pull to order explicitly excludes this reorder point approach. Rather
than the reactive method outlined above, raw material needs and orders are created in a
predictive fashion. As shown in Figure 3-2, the pull to order methodology brings
materials in based on orders in the backlog and their associated bills of material. The
(intended) result of this approach is that, by "reacting" several hours before the order
enters the OMAC check, that OMAC failures will be avoided. At the same time,
materials planners can be more aggressive about lowering the minimum on-hand
19
3.3
quantity of materials since material can be coordinated and pulled in if a need does
arise. Factories did, in fact, experience a several fold reduction in on-hand inventory
when converting to pull to order.
...
Gather backleog ofGathe cko  ~ Gather backlog of ATB Orders
... ATB Orders
Prioritize Prioritize
Orders Orders
Explode B=OM e
Compare on-
hand with Build
required Schedule
created
Send M aterial
RFequest to Orders BOd Pr u.n.e.SIS
SLC
commits
to d e liv ery D l v r
-2 0 T im e (h rs) -- +
Figure 3-2 Pull to Order Production Schedule
Pull to order is significant to this thesis because the information systems project
studied in the analysis requires factories to adopt a pull to order methodology. This
raised the stakes in the implementation decision.
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DSi2 PROJECT
3.4.1 DSi2 System Implementation Goal
DSi2, or Demand-Supply (matching with) i2, intends to achieve two key
outcomes:
1. Enable factories to operate in a pull to order material management
approach ("Demand Fulfillment" or DF), and
2. Link procurement activities of all five worldwide regions to allow
globally optimized material allocation and price negotiation ("Global
Planning/ Procurement Collaboration" or GPPC) .
The two objectives are fundamentally different from one another. Pull to order is
by definition a factory level activity that is executed on an hourly time scale. By
contrast, procurement is an activity that takes place on a weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly
time scale. Given the inherent divisibility of the two sub-projects, the early project
organizers chose to divide the implementation team into two essentially separate sub-
teams. For this thesis the author studied only the Demand Fulfillment component of the
project. In the remainder of the thesis, references to DSi2 or "the project" are intended to
encompass this piece of the i2-based solution, although there is every reason to believe
that a broader scope would have produced similar conclusions.
3.4.2 Implementation Scale
The copy exact information systems project observed was interesting in part
because of its sheer size and complexity. When fully rolled out, the phase one
implementation of DSi2 will have spanned more than 18 months and will have required
a total of 24,000 person-days of effort from implementation team personnel. Figure 3-3
below shows a timeline of system go-lives at various factories superimposed onto a
chart representing effort (in person-days) required by the project. This data and its
21
3.4
underlying assumptions will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 6, so the only
conclusion needing to be drawn at this point is that the project is of significant scale and
complexity to warrant careful consideration of project implementation methodology.
Also of note from Figure 3-3 are the plurality of groups that make up the team. At this
general level of abstraction, the team can be broken into four components: product
experts from the software vendor, systems designers and integrators from an external
consulting group, IT developers (company internal) and business process experts
(company internal).
I z
Dell
Business
Figure 3-3 DSi2 Team Staffing Levels
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KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER METHODOLOGY FOR DSi2
In this chapter, I will describe in detail the multiple approaches taken to the
problem of knowledge transfer, including written documentation, face-to-face
collaboration, remote (phone, e-mail, shared file...) collaboration, and team-to-team
personnel spillover. Based on results of interviews, surveys, and observations, I will
provide specific learnings about the "how" of knowledge transfer in this type of project.
4.1 IMPORTANCE OF CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL SHARING
As noted in the previous chapter, some of the biggest benefits - and burdens - of
Copy Exact are derived from the need for participants from diverse groups within the
company to coordinate and share knowledge across organizational borders. During the
DSi2 implementation at Dell, this knowledge sharing happened in two dimensions.
First, members of different business units (across autonomous product groups and
worldwide regions) were required to establish communication paths not heavily utilized
during normal business operations. Second, as the team was composed of internal
employees, external IT implementation consultants, and software vendor experts,
critical information paths needed to be created even within each individual site team.
Figure 4-1 below shows the magnitude of this first type of cross-group sharing.
The graphs demonstrate the workload for the second, third, fourth, and fifth
implementations that was handled by resources not belonging to the factory or region in
question. Similar data for remaining installations was not available to the same level of
detail since roster positions had not been formally allocated at the time of this study. As
Figure 4-1 highlights, the implementations relied on cross-organizational team members
for between 20 and 60% of workload. This figure accounts for the percentage of
dedicated team members (excludes all designated "shared resources", e.g. executive
management and IT personnel tasked with supporting multiple rollouts - including
these team members, cross-staffing would appear even more significant).
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Figure 4-1 Level of Project Staffing Across Lines of Business
4.2 EXECUTION OF CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL SHARING
The large amount of cross-organizational knowledge sharing was accomplished
through a variety of tactics that can be broadly categorized into those primarily executed
remotely and those based on face-to-face contact. Each of these categories, along with
their relative effectiveness will be discussed in more detail.
4.2.1 Remote Knowledge Transfer Methodologies
4.2.1.1 Shared Drive Access
One means by which teams were able to share data, implementation
methodologies, and best practices across organizational groups was via the company's
global intranet "shared drive". This platform was frequently used to archive master
implementation schedules (i.e. Gantt charts), FAQ lists, data "flat" files, and other large
general interest documents. The shared drive, while considered useful for specific types
of data, was not overwhelmingly popular among team members. Figure 4-2 represents
the results of a team opinion survey where the question "How valuable was the shared
drive access to sharing best practice knowledge?" was asked of nine "suppliers" of
shared information (i.e. those who participated in a second, third, or fourth
implementation team sharing knowledge they had gained during previous roll-outs) and
six "recipients" of this information (i.e. those who had not previously taken part in a
roll-out and relied on information gained from those involved in earlier roll-outs). The
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two horizontal bars represent the ranges of responses, and the mean response for each
group is represented by the tick mark inside the bar. These responses (supported by
interview discussion) indicate that use of a central shared drive is useful but not
Recipient "
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
NON VALUE ADDED
sufficient for knowledge transfer.
Figure 4-2 Value of Shared Drive Access
4.2.1.2 Phone and Voice Conference
A second means of remote knowledge sharing used was phone/voice
conference. Especially useful for discussion of more complex issues between team
members separated geographically (often by thousands of miles), phone interaction was
also recognized as an important channel for sharing information across organizations.
While the team survey responses were slightly more positive than for shared drive,
phone was also acknowledged to have limitations.
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1.2: How valuable was shared drive access to sharing best
practice knowledge?
Supplier
3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
EXTREMELY VALUABLE
1.3: How valuable was Phone/Voice Conference to sharing best practice
knowledge?
Supplier
Recipient
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
NON VALUE ADDED
3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
EXTREMELY VALUABLE
Figure 4-3 Value of Phone & Voice Conference
4.2.1.3 E-Mail
The final means of remote communication identified was e-mail. Surprisingly, e-
mail was viewed by the 15 respondents as the most valuable remote communication
method. There did exist a large spread in opinions, but by and large respondents and
interviewees cited the ability to target information broadly (all-user messages) or
1.1: How valuable was e-mail to sharing best practice knowledge?
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
NON VALUEADDED EXTREMELY VALUABLE
narrowly as the leading benefit of the medium
Figure 4-4 Value of E-Mail
4.2.2 Face-to-Face Communications
A key finding of the survey questions on methods of knowledge transfer was the
universally agreed upon dominance of "real" (i.e. person to person) interaction for
effective knowledge transfer.
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Recipient
4.2.2.1 Visits to DSi2-Live Factories
The first of three face-to-face channels considered was the practice of bringing
"recipients" of the implementation process (i.e. those planning later-round
implementations) to factories already running the DSi2 solution. These visitors typically
spent between a day and a week touring the plant, shadowing system operators, and
making contacts with some of the key members of the implementation team. As the
responses shown in Figure 4-5 show, there was an extremely wide dispersion of
opinions about the value of these activities. Surprisingly, the "recipients" (i.e. those
receiving the tours, etc) were less enthusiastic about the value of the travel than those
providing the tours, etc.
1.4: How valuable were tours of current DF users' facilities to sharing best
practice knowledge?
Supplier
Recipient
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
NON VALUE ADDED EXTREMELY VALUABLE
Figure 4-5 Value of Visits to Sites with DSi2 Active
4.2.2.2 Visits to Pre-Implementation Sites
The second, and more positively viewed, method of face-to-face sharing used
was factory visits to pre-implementation sites by employees who had already
successfully installed the DSi2 solution in their own factory. During these trips, the
visitors helped the factory think through their needs requirements, discussed with the
future implementation core team how the Solution might interface with that particular
factory's current systems, and helped generate pre-requisite requirements the factory
needed to accomplish prior to attempting the installation. Implicit in many of these
activities was "selling" of the DSi2 package to those who needed to fully buy-in to make
the process a success. The perception of this channel of communication, as shown in
Figure 4-6, was more universally positive than the visits in the reverse direction. The
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visits were especially desired by the factories receiving the extra sets of eyes, who
1.5: How valuable were visits TO future implementation sites to
sharing best practice knowledge?
Supplier
Recipient
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
NON VALUE ADDED EXTREMELY VALUABLE
apparently viewed the visits as almost wholly positive experiences.
Figure 4-6 Value of Visits to Pre-Implementation Sites
4.2.2.3 Team to Team Spillover
The final, and most positively viewed, channel of communications was
"spillover" of core team members from one implementation to the next. Spillover refers
to the practice of assigning one or more core members (i.e. full-time) of a completed
implementation to act as a core member of a subsequent rollout team. This type of face-
to-face, day-to-day contact provided the richest opportunities for true shared learnings,
since it allowed formation of a "we" relationship rather than an "us/them" one that
short plant visits in each direction might develop. In each of the early round
implementations, at least two core members of the implementation (not including
shared support such as IT staff) had already lived through one or more successful
implementations. The DSi2 owners institutionalized this through a waterfall staffing
process, where each team that rolled out the system was expected to take the lead in
managing knowledge sharing to one of the next sites. In this way, every new
implementation could benefit from the full-time support of one or more experienced
DSi2 implementers without placing too large a burden on the staff of any one LOB or
region. This spillover also occurred naturally through the inclusion of the systems
integration consultants. The consultants, who had been contracted for all 12 factory
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implementations, typically filled many of the slots for upcoming installation teams with
consultants rolling off a successful implementation.
The spillover process was viewed extremely positively by all polled participants
and represented one of the few cases of total consensus in the survey. 14 of the 15
respondents rated the importance of this staffing method as a five (on a 5 point scale),
1.6: How valuable was "spillover" of core team members to sharing best practice
knowledge?
Supplier
Recipient
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
NON VALUE ADDED EXTREMELY VALUABLE
while the fifteenth respondent rated it as a four.
Figure 4-7 Value of Team to Team Spillover
4.2.3 Cookbook
One formalized method of remote knowledge transfer observed during the DSi2
implementation deserves a closer analysis. During initial development and
implementation planning, the DSi2 Team leadership communicated an intention to use
lessons learned in the first roll-out to create a "cookbook," or comprehensive collection
of "recipes" on implementation technique required for successful DSi2 rollout. The
cookbook document was compiled from inputs of subject-matter experts in all areas of
the project, and then was distributed both by hard-copy and e-mailed/ shared drive soft-
copy. Initial response to the cookbook indicated that it was not being used nearly as
much as expected. Figure 4-8 shows the responses to the question "How useful was the
cookbook in setting up Go-Live?" which averaged slightly less than 3.0 of 5. However,
several team members added written comments to their response, indicating a widely
held belief that the cookbook would become much more useful as members of the
29
original development and implementation teams rolled off the DSi2 project, taking key
knowledge with them.
1.8: How useful was the "cookbook" in setting
up Go-Live?
Supplier
Recipient
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
NON VALUE ADDED EXTREMELY VALUABLE
Figure 4-8 Value of Cookbook Documentation
"... There is a need to have [the cookbook] available for when the original
designers and go-live swat teams have all gone to greener pastures."
- DSi2 Team Member
"[The cookbook] was used more in APCC and CCC roll-outs and now that it
has been tried and tested it will be even more valuable in future sites... For
future sites this document will slide up to about a 4 level if not 5 in usefulness."
- Another DSi2 Team Member
While the value of comprehensive written documentation is likely to increase
with time, it is not clear that all topics covered within the cookbook are equally likely to
be most valuable. Certain topics (e.g. user training materials and or project plan Gantt
charts) are relatively less difficult to transfer through a written, standalone medium like
the cookbook than are others (e.g. how to know when the factory is ready to go-live). At
the same time, some topics are less important to replicate from site to site (e.g. standing
meeting structures) than others, where great gains can be made from applying best
practices documented in past implementations (e.g. Hub readiness performance
criteria).
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Figure 4-9 Difficulty of and Importance of Cookbook Documentation, by
Topic
Figure 4-9 attempts to place each of the 13 chapters of the cookbook (initial
version) on a matrix of these two criteria, difficulty and importance. (Note: placements
were made based upon inputs from authors of the cookbook as well as senior members
of the implementation team. It in no way reflects the relative quality of contents in each
chapter, only the likelihood future implementation teams would look to a written
document for guidance on a given topic.) Items that were perceived as being difficult to
document and of lower importance to copy exactly (upper left quadrant) can be viewed as
ones of lowest priority for cookbook documentation. However, those where it was
deemed very important to implement in the proven way (copy exact) and with lesser
difficulty to document (lower right quadrant) can be considered the "low hanging fruit" of
the cookbook orchard. Finally, topics viewed as difficult to communicate in written
documentation but highly important to replicate (i.e. upper right quadrant) may be
included with understanding that greater supplemental support (phone conferences,
face-to-face visits) will be needed to ensure the full value of documented information is
gained.
Knowledge Transfer Conclusions
To summarize the key takeaways from the "how" of knowledge transfer at Dell's
DSi2 project:
" Cross-organizational knowledge sharing is at the core of successful Copy
Exact execution, and careful consideration must be paid to effective
channels and tactics.
" Written documentation and remote communications are necessary but
not sufficient for meaningful knowledge transfer.
" Most effective information sharing happens within a group that considers
itself a team.
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4.2.4
5 COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE COPY EXACT APPROACH
In this chapter, I will identify and, where possible, quantify the costs and benefits
of the Copy Exact approach as demonstrated during the DSi2 project. Included in this
analysis will be learning curve demonstration for "effort to implement" (person-hours)
and "smoothness" (number of exception events) of project go-live.
Additional factors considered will be maintainability and upgradability, along
with costs such as burden of coordination effort and lack of customization by site. A
large part of these considerations will be examined (and where possible quantified) via
benchmarking at Intel, where Copy Exact(ly) has been rigidly adhered to for several
years.
Application of the copy exact project management approach has clear benefits as
well as costs. Below several generalized (non-Dell specific) benefits and costs will be
presented followed by in depth quantification on several in the context of Dell's DSi2
implementation.
5.1 OVERVIEW OF COPY EXACT BENEFITS
5.1.1 Reduced Cost of Implementation
In cases where a sizeable fraction of implementation costs are upfront and
relatively fixed, major savings can be realized by sharing this fixed cost over multiple
implementations. In the case of Intel, hundreds of thousands of hours have been
invested in fine-tuning a manufacturing process. If identical processes can be applied in
multiple factories, the effective cost (on a per factory or per unit produced basis) will be
much improved. Similarly, if Burger King spends a great deal of effort developing an
optimal recipe for cooking French fries, it is likely to want to implement the exact recipe
across its thousands of restaurants worldwide.
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Greater Speed of Implementation
Almost every organization is somewhat constrained by human resources and
human bandwidth. In many, if not most, cases organizations are not capable of staffing
many separate development efforts in parallel. Thus, if results of development efforts
are not shared between parts of the organization, a development staff would be required
to execute projects one by one. The benefits of development would then be delayed to
all but the first "customer." This is especially significant in rapidly evolving industries
such as microprocessor manufacturing. In the case of Dell, limited IT staffing resources
make it impossible to respond to all requests from the multiple factories in a timely
manner.
5.1.3 Increased Stability of Implementation
In the case of projects that involve new technology development a major concern
can be stability of the new technology once implemented. In the case of enterprise
software development, there will likely be "bugs" that will not be understood until the
system is implemented in a live environment. The opportunity to fix these bugs during
initial implementations and to avoid them during subsequent ones is a key benefit for a
copy exact approach for mission critical software solutions.
5.1.4 Ease of Support and Enhancement
Frequently at issue for implementation is an entire string of possible future
enhancements. In the case that the first version implemented is a success, companies
have a call option of sorts to sink additional investments in for further development.
Developing a phase one project in a copy exact approach allows organizations to pursue
these enhancements also in a copy exact methodology. Thus the benefit of using copy
exact can be calculated as the savings resulting from application to phase one
development plus the value of the option to pursue phases 2,3,4... copy exact.
A further benefit that applies particularly to enterprise software development is
the ease of support for the implemented (phase one) system. There exists typically a
fixed cost for training IT personnel to support a given system. To the extent that the
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5.1.2
same fixed training cost can be shared over multiple instances of the same application,
the ongoing costs to IT support groups can be radically lower.
5.2 COPY EXACT AT DELL
The DSi2 project provides an opportunity to better understand how actual copy
exact benefits compare to the theoretical ones. Several sources of data were collected
and many interviews conducted in an attempt to quantify the actual benefits that can be
attributed to application of the copy exact methodology.
5.2.1 Reduced Cost of Implementation
During the implementation of DSi2, it was expected that the sequential rollouts
would create a constantly decreasing requirement in marginal effort for each factory. To
test this hypothesis, total person-days (including internal employees and external
consulting resources) is assumed to be a fair measure of "effort" required. Relatively
precise and accurate person-day measurements were gathered for each of the first four
factory implementations, using time sheets, archived staffing documents, and interviews
with team managers. The final eight factory implementations, which had not been
completed by the end of the on-site project, were estimated through precise (and
hopefully accurate) staffing plans provided by team leaders.
Since typically, two or more separate factory implementation efforts were in
process at a given time, a significant portion of the team's resources were splitting time
over multiple efforts. In each case, efforts were made to allocate each person's efforts as
specifically as possible. If, for instance, a system architect was working on both the
Malaysian and Chinese factory rollouts (APCC and CCC, respectively) their time was
allocated 50% / 50% over the two teams. There were times, however, when shared
resources could not be reasonably attributed to one, two, or three specific factories. In
these cases, the person-days were allocated over all implementations in the given phase.
As the clustering of bars in Figure 5-1 indicates, the first two factories (PN2 and MT12)
were executed closely to one another, collectively named "Phase 0". The next four
implementations (PN1, EG1, APCC, and CCC) made up "Phase 1"', and the final six
factories were planned for "Phase 2" execution. This assumption clearly reduced some
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of the precision of the learning curve analysis, but hopefully not the accuracy. For
phases 0, 1, and 2 respectively, 63%, 64%, and 84% of person-days were attributable to
individual factories and did not need to be shared. Nonetheless, it is possible that the
relative magnitude of effort required within a phase may be inaccurate (i.e. it is possible
that more of the shared support was spent on PN1 and EG1 than on APCC and CCC).
Effort Rquired By Install
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Figure 5-1 Person-Days Required Per Factory Rollout
Figure 5-1 presents the findings of this learning curve assessment. The dashed
line represents the effort required (approximately 4000 person-days) to implement one
site. As was expected, every subsequent rollout required significantly fewer person-
days to execute, and the arrows represent the gap between the actual effort required to
implement and the likely effort required to do so if other factories had not already
blazed the trail. This gap can be seen as the "value" (in person-day terms) of copy exact.
It can alternatively be viewed as the theoretical cost (in person-day terms) of allowing
each factory to reinvent the wheel.
In aggregate, the actual implementation for 12 factories is expected to require
-24,000 person-days. If no coordination existed between factories (i.e. the opposite of
copy exact), this number would be -48,000 person-days - approximately 100 person-
years of additional labor! However, it is unlikely that, even in a highly decentralized
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company, every site would develop a completely unique solution. A more reasonable
assumption would be that - in absence of an explicit copy exact philosophy - each
organizational group (as defined on the company's organizational chart) would seek to
implement its own unique solution. At Dell, eight such organizational units exist - four
of which are product-focused organizations in North America (Optiplex, Dimension,
Portables, and Servers/Workstations) and four of which are geographically focused
worldwide facilities (Asia Pacific, China, Ireland, and Brazil). As detailed in Table 5-1,
this approach would be expected to require -36,000 person-days, or a net increase of 50
person-years. This conclusion assumes that each multi-factory group was able to
complete both rollouts with 5000 person-days (as Optiplex did with 4000 for PN2 and
1000 for MT12), and each single factory group performs just as PN2 did in the initial
DSi2 rollout (4000 person-days).
Table 5-1 Theoretical Rollout Effort Required for Non-Copy Exact
Implementations
Optiplex PN2, MT12 5000
Dimension EGI, AMI 5000
Portables MT12 (New Line) 4000
Servers/Workstations PN1 4000
Asia Pacific APCC, APCC2 5000
China CCC 4000
Europe (Ireland) EMF2, EMF3 5000
Brazil BCC 4000
TOTAL 36,000
Readers may note that the effort required for implementation experienced a
dramatic drop-off following the first iteration, but remained relatively flat for the next
11. This seems to reject the hypothesis that a continuous learning curve was present
during the DSi2 project, however there exist several possible explanations for this trend
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that do not reject learning curve effects. First, the order of factory implementations was
determined in large part by system readiness and level of buy-in from factory
management. This tended to front-load the process with factories that had a strong
foundation of IT and business processes that greatly simplified the implementation
process. Second, since the implementation process was planned in three waves (i.e.
phases), it would be unreasonable to expect major project to project improvement for
implementations essentially executed in parallel. Finally, implementation requirements
for later stage factories are based upon (detailed) projections rather than observation.
While this data was carefully developed and is believed to be highly credible, the project
management for DSi2 favored conservative assumptions about personnel requirements.
It is reasonable to assume that actual effort required to implement may be significantly
less than forecasted.
5.2.2 Increased Speed of Implementation
In the case of Dell's DSi2 program, a large percentage of the implementation
team was shared between multiple location installs. Since limited IT staff resources
would have precluded the company from developing multiple (separate) applications in
parallel, the copy exact approach taken greatly reduced the number of months necessary
to get all facilities up and running. Figure 5-2 below shows the contrast between the
timeline of implementations actually achieved (left) with what might have existed
assuming a complete "from scratch" sequential approach (i.e. focusing IT resources on
developing a solution for Factory A, then focusing those resources on creating a new
solution for Factory B, etc). As the graphs illustrate, the sequential copy exact approach
allowed the implementation team to cover all 12 worldwide facilities in less than 600
days (from initial development to 12th go-live). By contrast, had each factory received a
solution that did not build on previous work, fewer than three full implementations
could be completed in the same time period.
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Figure 5-2 Speed of Multiple Implementations: Copy Exact vs. Non-Copy
Exact Approach
5.2.3 Greater Stability of Implementation
Stability of implementation is a critical consideration for any system that touches
mission critical areas of an organization. In the case of Dell and DSi2, the application
impacted order delivery performance and component inventories on-hand, arguably
two of the most important metrics in operations at Dell. Thus, one of the most
significant benefits of Copy Exact in the case of DSi2 was stability of implementation.
To measure the fuzzy concept of "stability", we can look at several different
metrics. In the case of this study, two major avenues were pursued: factory performance
metrics and error reporting metrics. A factory performance metric approach would
attempt to measure "stability" of an installation by how much variability or chaos
appeared in factory metrics (e.g. inventory, cycle time, % of OMAC fails, etc) and would
equate this variability with the newly implemented system's instability. Ultimately, this
approach was rejected since too many external variables existed in the environment that
potentially confounded the validity of the factory metrics (e.g. supplier recall on part X
or a spike in order volume at time Y).
Instead, this study took the approach of monitoring reports of known system
errors, or "bugs" that are conveniently tracked by the company's centralized IT group
via a software package called Remedy. IT related problems experienced by factory
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personnel are reported via a centralized IT number to a member of the support staff who
logs the call with a "trouble ticket" and assigns a priority to the problem reported based
on severity. Severity 1 ("sevl") trouble tickets, the most severe, include those creating
widespread catastrophic failures. Severity 4 trouble tickets, the least severe, include
problems likely caused by incorrect user training or those that do not threaten the
immediate performance of an application. For the purposes of this study, Sev2 & Sev3
trouble tickets were measured because (1) they are much more common than Sev1, and
(2) they point directly to system failure rather than user training.
Below in Figure 5-3, the numbers of independent Sev2/Sev3 trouble tickets
reported during the first 21 days of live system operation are compared for each of the
first four installations. In each successive implementation, the number of trouble tickets
logged dramatically declined. During each installation, bugs in the code were
uncovered, repaired, and eliminated from future implementations. It is reasonable to
expect that, if no organizational learning curve existed each implementation would be
equally as problematic as the first. The arrows in Figure 5-3 represent the gap between
the likely number of trouble tickets logged and the actual number. Thus, the sum of
these arrows approximates the "value" of stability gained from successive copy exact
implementations, which in this case totaled to more than 400 during the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
implementations alone. If the trouble ticket performance demonstrated on the 4th
implementation ("EG1") was assumed to be the best that could be achieved, a total of
1325 trouble tickets will have been averted. If system stability can be further improved,
the value will be even greater.
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Figure 5-3 Implementation Smoothness - IT Trouble Tickets Reported by
Rollout
One important footnote to the assumptions underlying the trouble ticket
analysis: During the initial go-live ("PN2"), the trouble ticket system was bypassed and
accurate data were not collected. Because of the extreme system instability, an IT staff
member was dedicated full-time to resolution of high priority DSi2 issues. Core
members of implementation estimated an equivalent trouble ticket and support team
level as at least 2X the level on the following implementation ("MT12").
5.2.4 Ease of Support and Enhancement
From an IT perspective, possibly the leading benefit of copy exact methodology
is simplified support and enhancement. Table 5-1 represents the scaling requirements of
IT staff for copy exact vs. non CE projects and has been based on interviews with senior
management of the company's IT department. Highlighted are the enhancement,
maintenance, and support functions. As a result of DSi2's copy exact approach, future
enhancements bound for 12 worldwide sites will require the same effort as similar
enhancements designed for only one site - a virtually fixed cost. Application support,
while not perfectly fixed, will require significantly fewer resources to manage a single
platform across the factories than would have been required to support different
platforms for each factory. It is estimated that approximately 16 sustaining resources
will be required to manage enhancements, development, and support given the current
copy exact structure. By contrast, if solutions had been indepenently developed by each
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of the four lines of business (Dimension, Lattitude, etc.) and by each of the four
worldwide regions, more than 5X as many full-time resources would be required.
Table 5-2 Comparison of Projected IT Development and Support Staff
One Solution / One Solution / Two (diff) Solutions /
One Site Multi - Sites Two Sites
Initial Development X X 2X
Enhancements X X 2X
Maintenance X X 2X
Development
Application X X + 2X
Support
Deployment X X + 2X
Process Consulting
Deployment Code X X 2X
Migration
Initial Interface X X 2X
Development
The benefits of copy exact extend beyond sustaining and basic enhancement
effort. With the case of DSi2, the copy exact methodology used has provided the
company with an option to pursue next phase enhancements if the platform proves to be
successful. The below Figure 5-4 shows the layers of copy exact in a large-scale, multi-
phase project. Beginning from the bottom layer, factories and business units must
operate with come degree of consistency in their business processes (order schedules,
inventory counting procedures, etc) to create a feasible platform for copy exact cross-site
IT applications. The combination of these two layers enable the operational strategy of
"pull-to-order" (discussed at length in Chapter 4). Once factories manage to work under
similar processes, systems, and strategies, major enhancements can be developed that
create previously unattainable value.
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Figure 5-4 Future Upgradability of Common DSi2 Platform
5.2.5 Organizational Knowledge Sharing
There are many other benefits to copy exact that relate to softer, less quantifiable
topics. Through interviews with managers from a variety of functional areas, three of
these opportunities for increased organizational effectiveness became clear.
* Metrics Comparisons - In the current state of operations, it is often difficult
or impossible to compare factory performance between regions on LOBs
in a meaningful way. A key contributor to this is the inconsistency of
factory automation systems currently in use.
* Best Practice Identification - Because factories often cannot be compared
with relevant metrics, it can be difficult to identify factories that have
created best practices for operations.
* Personnel Sharing - Since business practices and processes vary
significantly from factory to factory, it is difficult for factories that are
geographically very close (in some cases sharing the same parking lot) to
cross-staff for roles like Scheduler where business process differences
make the roles very dissimilar.
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5.2.6 Summary of Copy Exact Benefits Measured
Each of the above findings is significant alone, but when presented together, the
benefits of copy exact for the DSi2 implementation appear even more sizeable. Table 5-3
below summarizes the different types of benefits measured. Because the monetary
value for each category is subject to wide interpretation, the author leaves it to the
reader to determine financial impact resulting from the savings of labor, time, or system
bugs.
Table 5-3 Summary of Copy Exact Benefits
Cop Exc Rega Autnm Esiae Savings
Cost 24,500 person-days 36,000 person-days 50 person-years
Speed 529 Days (12 sites) 1721 Days (12 sites) 3.25 Years
Stability 625 Sev2/3 Incidents 1950 Sev2/3 Incidents 1325 Incidents
Sustainability 16 Full-Time Support 82 Full-Time Support 66 Support Personnel
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5.2.7 Costs of Copy Exact
While many of the key benefits of Copy Exact have been outlined and, when
possible, quantified above, there do exist some drawbacks to the approach. Two loosely
quantifiable drawbacks are the implicit loss of customization (i.e. desired functionality)
and the expense and burden of business travel.
5.2.7.1 Loss of Customization
One of the largest challenges the implementation team of DSi2 faced was how to
limit and choose the scope of the system. The scope definition was made especially
difficult by the number and diversity of factories targeted to implement the system. To
combat the dreaded "scope creep" that frequently occurs when a project is managed by
so many stakeholders, the DSi2 team leadership adopted the practice of "70/30", which
was a stated objective that the designed solution should address the most important 70%
of users' needs. Remaining functionality (i.e. the "30 percent") would be considered
during phase 2 upgrades once the initial 70% was successfully installed. Without a
doubt, not every factory's idea of the "most important 70%" was the same. For instance,
a relatively less important need of many factories (e.g. Optiplex, Servers &
Workstations) was the ability to manually override the Factory Planner run plan for
batches of orders simultaneously. At Optiplex and Server factories, orders tended to
have 10, 20, or even 50 systems grouped into one row on the FP interface, since
customers of those products tend to buy large blocks of identical systems together.
Thus, the scheduler could reprioritize or override 500 systems with just 10 or so
operations. However, factories that build Dimension, which is primarily marketed
towards the home user, tended to see almost exclusively order bizes of one. Thus, to
reprioritize or reassign 500 systems, it would take the FP scheduler 500 operations.
Conflicting priorities like this meant that no factory was able to truly get their top 70%
included in the features list for the Phase 1 Solution.
Below, Figure 5-5 provides the results from a survey question asked of 15
members of the DSi2 implementation team to better understand how significant this
drawback was perceived to be. There was a wide range of response, from 30% to 80%,
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and averaged to be around 60%. While this value is lower than the stated goal of 70%, it
is not significantly lower. Thus, the perceptions of those involved in the project indicate
that this effect is not by itself a reason to avoid Copy Exact.
3.2: The DF solution you installed 
meets what percent
of the fun ctio nality the site re qurire s?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Figure 5-5 Percent of Functionality Met by Phase 1 Solution
5.2.7.2 Burden of Travel for Support
A second clear drawback to Copy Exact directly relates to the face-to-face
knowledge transfer activities that in Section 4.2.2 was so highly acclaimed. When
managing a multi-region project, face-to-face communication channels require one or
both parties to travel away from their home and office. While absolutely necessary for
effective knowledge sharing, this does not come without costs. Table 5-4 shows
approximate amounts of travel required of the Austin-based DSi2 team members to
make this information sharing happen. Travel records for non-Austin based employees
were not available, and thus the table only represents half of the equation, so the actual
cost to Dell and its employees is significantly greater than is shown.
Table 5-4 Approximate Amount of Travel Required of Austin-based
employees for support of EG1, APCC, and CCC: Sept - Dec '00
Nights Away
40
128
301
119
TOTAL 588
Number of
Nashville
9
15
25
3
52
Trips
Asia
2
11
15
10
38
Miles Traveled
54,400
244,000
340,000
204,800
843,200
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Supplier
Recipient
Sept.
Oct.
Nov
Dec
STRATEGIC QUESTIONS FOR COPY EXACT
The DSi2 project demonstrated many facets of the costs, benefits, and tactics
involved in executing a large-scale Information Systems project with Copy Exact
methodology. But, what impact does this learning have for Dell's IT strategy? Can
Copy Exact become a cornerstone for Dell's operational strategy and organization?
It can be argued that as Dell increases its scale and continues its plans for
international expansion that ability to bring green-field factories on-line quickly and
efficiently becomes a major operational advantage for the company - much as it has
become for Intel. To become most effective at new factory installation, the organization
will need to further develop skills with coordination, possibly even Copy Exact.
6.1 SYSTEMS DYNAMICS OF COPY EXACT
To examine how repeated applications of Copy Exact may impact the company's
organization, a systems dynamics map is proposed and explained below. While the
map cannot be quantifiably verified, it presents one view for evolution of an
organization developing a competence in Copy Exact.
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Figure 6-1 Systems Dynamics Model of Factory Divergence and Convergence
Below is a brief summary of the dynamics loops illustrated above. For purposes
of clarity, the diagram will be described from left to right.
6.1.1 Fundamental Differences in Process
This is the initial input to the system and includes objective differences in process
like order size (i.e. consumer PC LOBs tend to make a lot of one unit orders while the
business desktop LOBs tend to make orders of 50 or 100), location of factory, or scales of
production.
6.1.2 Similarities of Systems
As differences in the manufacturing process develop, we can expect to see a
reduction in the simidlarities between systems used in various factories, where "systems"
refer to automations systems, training systems, inventory management systems, and the
like.
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6.1.3 Similarities in Operating Philosophies
In addition to affecting the similarities of systems, increased process differences
cause decreased similarities of operating philosophies, where operating philosophies
might include decisions like cellular manufacturing vs. assembly line, or running a
backlog to zero vs. keeping a small (e.g. 2 hour) queue of un-built orders. These
operating philosophies are central to many of the organizational dynamics that impact
Dell's initiative to implement CE projects. They're the subtle differences that can lead to
extreme we/they attitudes that lead to Not Invented Here.
6.1.4 Opportunities for Copy Exact
As systems and philosophies become more similar across an organization, there
will appear more projects that can potentially be rolled out in a CE approach since the
platforms and paradigms of the various factories will be compatible. Similarly, and
more to the point, as systems and philosophies become more diverse, there become
fewer and fewer chances to implement a single upgrade or project across multiple
factories.
6.1.5 Copy Exact Projects Completed
Holding all else as equal, if the number of projects that are candidates for CE
increases, so should the number of CE projects pursued. That is, if a company's
managers have a certain likelihood of allowing a CE project to move forward, then
doubling the number of potential projects should double the number of adopted
projects.
6.1.6 Common Systems Loop
Each time factories across the organization accomplish a project (e.g. factory
automation system, testing methodology) in a unified fashion, it brings the systems
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platforms of the buildings one step closer together. Alternatively, every time a project is
implemented differently across several facilities it makes the systems platforms that
much more disparate. This is represented in the top reinforcing loop.
6.1.7 Common Philosophy Loop
At the same time, every project that requires coordination between facilities
helps foster a sense of shared experiences and relationships which bring operating
philosophies one step closer together. This effect is just as likely to come from lunchtime
conversation as from any formalized discussion of operating philosophy. The effect is
powerful and subtle at the same time.
6.1.8 Savings from Economies of Scale
One of the (several) major benefits of CE is the ability to get more bang for the
buck by not reinventing the wheel and by amortizing development costs across multiple
facilities. This is the positive byproduct of the common systems loop. In Dell's case,
having implemented a single factory scheduling solution rather than multiple ones will
result in a measured economic savings-of well over $30 million.
6.1.9 More Effective Organization
This is difficult to quantify but might be the most important benefit to Copy
Exact from an organizational perspective. When managers and project managers across
a worldwide organization share similar beliefs and paradigms, a number of positive
results come about. First, people managers have the flexibility to rotate and share
human resources between factories - either for knowledge-transfer or shared capacity
reasons. This benefit was illustrated with the case of PN1 and PN2, two neighboring
factories that were among the first to implement the DSi2 solution. Prior to
implementing a single common factory scheduling system, these two adjacent factories
had difficulty rotating planning personnel between them. The common DSi2 platform
has enabled this sort of sharing, which may provide the foundation for rich exchange of
skills and knowledge between the two synergistic organizations.
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Second, if factories have dissimilar scheduling systems and processes, it can
become very difficult to make meaningful performance comparisons between them.
Similar IT platforms that generate comparable performance measurement metrics make
identification of best practices much more effective.
6.1.10 Organizational Emphasis on Copy Exact
Thus far, the organizational dynamics diagram looks pretty bleak. The only
system inputs are unavoidable differences and the only loops at work are reinforcing
death spirals. Hope is not all lost. The leaders of any company have it within their
control to create an emphasis in the organization for adoption of copy exact projects, and
by increasing pressure on their teams to coordinate they can cause the reinforcing loops
to spiral upward. This is the leverage that leaders have in shaping the outcome of their
organization and a central part of my message during project presentations at the
companies focused on the need to proactively assert this leverage.
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the findings of this research, the author proposes that several steps be
taken to successfully integrate Copy Exact into the organization.
7.1.1 Recommendations for Executive Management
Successfully integrating Copy Exact in the future will require that the company's
leadership provide the proper support and vision for the organization. Specifically, the
Author believes that Executive Management should:
" Recognize the Value Potential of the Copy Exact Approach - As Chapter 5
presented, the quantifiable - and non-quantifiable - benefits created by
Copy Exact are compelling. As Table 5-3 (p.44) shows, use of Copy Exact
on the Demand Fulfillment component of DSi2 will save the company
over 1300 system bugs, 50 person-years of implementation resources, and
66 ongoing support staff, all in 3.25 years less time that without Copy
Exact coordination.
" Emphasize and Communicate Copy Exact - As the systems dynamics model
(Figure 6-1, p.48) suggested, the natural state of autonomous sub-groups
is dissimilarity. If Copy Exact is to become part of Dell's operational
toolkit, it must be emphasized as one of the organizational priorities and
the virtues of closer coordination between factories must be continuously
communicated to those expected to manage the burden that coordination
creates. As the model also suggested, the emphasis required can
diminish over time as the organization becomes more accustomed to
working with Copy Exact.
" Promote Importance of Employee Sharing - One of the biggest factors in the
success of the Copy Exact implementation appears to be the full-time
sharing of employees across business units (Section 4.2.2.3 Team to Team
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Spillover, p.28). While it seems clear that this behavior is in the best
interest of the Company, the business units permitting their key
employees to support cross-organizational projects should be recognized
for their sacrifice. In resource constrained situations (such as what a
company might face after a round of downsizing) business units may be
reluctant to allow key employees to support such projects. Executive
management can clearly reinforce positive sharing behavior with clear
communication and a properly aligned incentive system that rewards
subgroups for acting in the best interest of the Company.
* Promote Opportunities for Employee Rotation - Building on the above
recommendation, Executive Management should also vigorously
encourage inter-factory career progression. Relationship networks
formed by inter-factory promotion and movement of key employees
quickly help to alleviate any unhealthy "we/they" mentality among the
groups. To the extent that experience across factories (even across
regions) is seen as a "fast-track" to career progression, top employees will
be motivated to move across the organization.
" Create a Forum for Best Practices Sharing - Finally, for Manufacturing at
Dell to move towards a free-flow of ideas, it may be helpful to create and
promote annual or semi-annual forums for operational innovation. With
such a forum, methods and processes created in any of the Company's
worldwide factories can be publicized and recognized. Through such
forums, ideas ranging from the high level (such as the DSi2 Pull to Order
philosophy) to the ground level (e.g. peer training programs for
Manufacturing Associates) could be presented.
7.1.2 Recommendations for Copy Exact Project Teams
Members of the DSi2 team would likely support the assertion that, when it
comes to the true success factors of a large-scale Copy Exact project, "the devil is in the
details". :
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" Use a Variety of Knowledge Transfer Channels - Chapter 4 examines the
multiple channels of knowledge transfer used during the DSi2 Project.
The lessons learned through that process should provide a guide for
future Copy Exact projects. First, every communication path used added
to the overall effectiveness of the process. Second, the teams found face-
to-face communication to be of highest importance to successful sharing
of best practices and lessons learned.
* Develop a Cookbookfor Future Use- The cookbook created during the DSi2
Project is expected to be a useful knowledge transfer tool, especially as
involvement by the original development team dwindles. However, it is
reasonable to assume that some sections of the Cookbook will be more
widely referenced than others. Prior to investing hundreds of hours into
creating a Cookbook, it would be worthwhile to evaluate those topics
which are both important to replicate in future implementations and are
not prohibitively difficult to document.
" Recognize Constraints of Copy Exact, Strive for a 70% Solution - Chapter 5
describes many of the benefits and a few costs of Copy Exact. The DSi2
Project Team had a stated objective of delivering an initial solution that
addressed the most important 70% of users' requirements (with potential
to upgrade for the remaining 30% at a later date). This mindset was
invaluable in avoiding the potential stalemates that arise from a solution
designed to work everywhere, while being perfect nowhere.
7.2 CONCLUSION
Dell Computer Corporation has demonstrated operational excellence during its
first 17 years of operation. However, a combination of its growth rate, global expansion
strategy, and customer focused structure has created several operational challenges for
the coming years. Dell must explore strategies and tactics that allow it to manage the
complexities of a large, diversified organization so as to leverage its scale for competitive
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advantage. Copy Exact, which has been demonstrated as a successful approach during
the DSi2 project, holds the potential to help Dell to do exactly that.
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